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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of ) 
LLOYD A. FRY COMPANY, ) Case No. 13980 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Air Conservation 
Committee finding that emissions from the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing 
Company plant, in Woods Cross, Utah, were in violation of Section 3.2, 
Code of Air Conservation Regulations. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee asks this court to review 
the matter and affirm the order of Dr. Grant S. Winn, Decision and 
Orders entered by the Utah Air Conservation Committee, and Memorandum 
Decision of the Third Judicial District Court. Respondent further 
asks this court to sustain the finding and conclusions of the Utah 
Air Conservation Committee, which were based upon substantial evidence. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Dr. Grant S. Winn, Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Conser-
vation Committee, sent notices to the manager of the Lloyd A. Fry 
Roofing Company, located at Woods Cross, Utah, prior to September 4, 
1973. These notices indicated that the emissions from the stacks 
-1-
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at the plant were in direct violation of Section 3.2.1 of the Code 
of Air Conservation Regulations for Visible Emissions. The visible 
emission's regulations clearly define the term "contaminant" and 
then set the necessary emission limitations so as to insure that 
the air we breathe will not become injurious to human health or wel-
fare, animal or plant life# or property, nor would it unreasonably 
interfere with the enjoyment of life or use of property. 
Section 3.2.1 of the Code of Air Conservation Regulations is 
clear, reasonable and provides fair and adequate warning to any vio-
lator. Section 3.2.1 states as follows: 
3.2.1. Single sources of emission from existing 
installations except incinerators and internal combustion 
engines shall be of a shade or density no darker than a 
No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or an equivalent opacity. 
On the 16th day of January, 1974, Dr. Grant S. Winn issued an 
order to the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company that his Woods Cross faci-
lity was in violation of Section 3.2 of the Visible Emissions Regu-
lations. The Lloyd A. Fry Company operates an asphalt spray process 
upon felt material in the production of asphalt shingles used in 
roofing. Dr. Winn indicated in his order that the Fry Company was 
causing single source emissions from its west stack and east stack 
as a result of the asphalt spray process upon the felt material. The 
findings of Dr. Winn indicated that the emissions were not the result 
of the operation of incinerators or internal combustion engines. 
Certain members of the staff of the Utah Air Conservation Com-
mittee and the Davis County Health Department made inspections of the 
-9-. 
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Lloyd A. Fry Company facility at Woods Cross on the following dates 
with these results: 
DATE OPACITY 
West Stack East Stack 
9/6/73 (highest, and lowest of 12 
readings) 45%-60% 
9/27/73 (highest and lowest of 7 
readings) 35%-55% 
10/3/73 (single reading) 55% 
10/4/73 (average of readings 
over 45-minute period) 45%-50% 
10/9/73 (five-minute reading -
highest and lowest point) 40%-60% 40%-60% 
11/9/73 (single reading) 45% 50% 
These staff members are trained to read the opacity of emissions 
from a stationary source and must qualify as observers for visually 
determining the opacity of emissions. These individuals receive 
training and certification and learn procedures to be used in the 
field fa: the determination of plume opacity. 40 C.F.R. (Code of 
Federal Regulations) 60 sets forth the standard of performance for 
stationary sources. The appendix to these standards describes the 
method of making a visual determination of the opacity of emissions 
from the stationary sources. The procedure in making the opacity 
observations with regard to the steam plumes states the following: 
2.3 Observations. Opacity observations shall be 
made at the point of greatest opacity in that portion 
of the plume where condensed water vapor is not present. 
The observer shall not look continuously at the plume, 
but instead shall observe the plume momentarily at 15-
second intervals. 
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2.3.1 Attached steam plumes. When condensed water 
vapor is present within the plume as it emerges from the 
emission outlet, opacity observations shall be made be-
yond the point in the plume at which condensed water vapor 
is no longer visible. The observer shall record the 
approximate distance from the emission outlet to the point 
in the plume at which the observations are made* 
2.3.2 Detached steam plumes. When water vapor in 
the plume condenses and becomes visible at a distinct 
distance from the emission outlet, the opacity of emis-
sions should be evaluated at the emission outlet prior 
to the condensation of water vapor and the formation of 
the steam plume. 40 C.F.R. 60. 
The qualified observers are trained to read the plume at the 
point of greatest opacity beyond the breakpoint where the steam 
dissipates, or in that portion of the plume where condensed water 
vapor is absent. The readings were taken by these certified smoke 
readers beyond the point at which condensed water vapor is no 
longer visible. This procedure was employed because the Fry plumes 
were attached plumes rather than detached plumes as set forth above 
in the procedure. These provisions were added by the Environmental 
Protection Agency to make it clear that the opacity of contaminated 
water in steam plumes is to be read at the point where water does 
not exist in condensed form. The two specific instructions are (1) 
where the case for opacity can be observed prior to the formation 
of the condensed water plume, and the other (2) for the case where 
opacity is to be observed after the condensed water plume has 
dissipated. 
The opacity of white plumes is measured in terms of percentage, 
while the opacity of black plumes is measured in terms of numbers 
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from a Ringelmann Chart. Each number from 1 to 5 on the Ringelmann 
Chart represents an increase of 20% opacity from zero. The equiva-
lent opacity of a Ringelmann Chart No. 2 is 40%. The single sources 
of emission from the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company were of a shade or 
density darker than No. 2, Ringelmann Chart (40% black), or equiva-
lent opacity, on the dates above mentioned. Such readings disclose 
a violation of Section 3.2.1, Visible Emissions Regulations, Code 
of Air Conservation Regulations. The breakpoint of a wet plume 
(one containing visible, uncombined water) is the point where the 
uncombined water disappears from the plume. The readings taken by 
the state and county observers were made beyond this breakpoint. The 
particulate matter in a wet plume can be accurately read beyond the 
breakpoint and the plume at that point is free of visible, uncombined 
water. The readings taken from the east and west stacks of the Lloyd 
A..Fry Company were of particulate matter, and the emissions were 
read beyond the breakpoint. The excessive emission readings from 
the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company process were of air contaminants 
within the meaning of Section 1.1.3, Code of Air Conservation Regu-
lations and were neither the result of an unavoidable breakdown of 
equipment or procedures nor the result of a procedure necessary to 
the operation of a process described in Section 3.2.6(b), Visible 
Emissions Regulations, Code of Air Conservation Regulations. 
Dr. Grant S. Winn issued his order of January 16, 1974, that 
the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company submit to his office within 30 
days of the receipt of that order a request for variance, accom-
-5-
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panied with a compliance schedule or cease operation of the facility. 
This order, under authority of Section 26-24-11, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) was to become final, unless within 20 days of its 
receipt a written request for a hearing before the Utah Air Conser-
vation Committee was made by the Lloyd A. Fry Company as provided 
in Section 26-24-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). Fry 
requested a hearing before the Air Conservation Committee to answer 
charges, which commenced on April 4, 1974, before a Subcommittee of 
the Utah Air Conservation Committee, The hearing was recessed on 
April 5, 1974, and reconvened on May 15, 1974, on which date the 
hearing was concluded. The Subcommittee affirmed Dr. Winn's order 
dated January 16, 1974. 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company then filed a Motion of Review of 
the Decision of the Subcommittee, which Decision was reviewed by the 
Utah Air Conservation Committee on December 19, 1974. The Utah Air 
Conservation Committee affirmed the Decision of the Subcommittee of 
Hearing Examiners in accordance with Section 26—24—11, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). Fry appealed the Decision of the 
Committee to the Third Judicial District Court in defiance of 
Section 26-24-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). The office 
of Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal of Fry 
in light of the statute which permits judicial review before the Utah 
Supreme Court, rather than a district court. This statute provides: 
(1) Except as specifically provided in this section and in 
section 26-24-11 (5) (e), all final orders or determinations 
of the committee or the executive secretary are subject to 
judicial review in the Supreme Court of Utah. . ." 
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Fry's appeal was dismissed by the Third Judicial District Court on 
January 31, 1975. Fry then filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court on February 4, 1975. 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
The Air Conservation Act was enacted by the Utah State Legis-
lature in 1967 (Laws of 1967, Chapter 47, Paragraph 1). This act 
created within the Division of Health, the Air Conservation Council, 
now known as the Air Conservation Committee, and empowered it to act 
in the control, abatement and prevention of air pollution. The 
Federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 1857 et. seq.) was amended by Public 
Law 91-604, dated December 31, 1970, entitled "Clean Air Amendents 
of 1970." Section' 108 of that Act required the administrator to pub-
lish a list of air pollutants, which, in his judgment, have an adverse 
effect on public health and welfare and the presence of which in the 
ambient air resulted from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources. It further provided that the administrator, after consul-
tation with appropriate advisory committees and federal departments 
and agencies, issue to the states and appropriate air pollution con-
trol agencies information on air pollution control techniques, and 
such information was to include data relating to the technology and 
costs of emission control. Section 109 of the federal act required 
the administrator to promulgate regulations setting forth a national 
primary ambient standard for each air pollutant. A primary ambient 
air quality standard is one which the attainment and maintenance in the 
-7-
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judgment of the administrator, is requisite to protect the public 
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with 
the presence such air pollutant in the ambient air. Section 107 of 
the Federal Act states that each state is to have the primary respon-
sibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area 
comprising the state, by submitting an implementation plan .for such 
state, which must specify the manner in which national primary and 
secondary ambient air quality standards are to be met, achieved and 
* maintained within each air quality control region of the State. 
Section 110 of the Act required each state, after public hearing, to 
adopt and submit to the administrator a plan providing for the imple-
mentation, maintenance and enforcement of each primary standard and 
each secondary standard. The adminstrator was thereafter required 
to approve or disapprove the plan so submitted and set out criteria 
of ei^ht requirements that each plan must fulfill before it could be 
approved. One of these criteria necessary was that the plan must 
include emission limitations (see Section 110(a)(2)(B) of said Glean 
Air Act Amendment)m Thereafter, the Utah Legislature, in 1971, made 
two significant changes in the Air Conservation Act (Laws 1971, 
Chapter 54, Paragraphs 1 and 2). Section 26-24-1.5 was added to the 
Air Conservation Act. This provision sets forth a declaration of 
public policy and states the purpose of the act. Section 26-24-1.5(1) 
reads as follows: 
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this 
state and the purpose of this act to achieve and maintain 
such levels of air quality as will protect human health and 
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safety, and to the greatest degree practicable, prevent 
injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the 
comfort and convenience of the people, promote the economic 
and social development of the state, and facilitate the 
enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state. 
Subparagraph (3) reads in part as follows: 
To these ends it is the purpose of this act to 
provide a framework within which air quality may be 
protected and consideration given to the public in-
terest at all levels of planning and development 
within the state. 
Subparagraph (2) was then added to 26-24-10, which reads as follows: 
The committee may establish such emission control 
requirements by rule, regulation or standard as in its 
judgment may be necessary to prevent, abate, or control 
air pollution. These requirements may be for the state 
as a whole or may vary from area to area, as may be 
appropriate, to facilitate accomplishment of the pur-
poses of this act, and in order to take account of 
varying local conditions. In adopting these emission 
control requirements, the committee shall conduct public 
hearings in the same manner and under such terms and 
conditions and with the same notice as required in Sub-
section (1) of this section. 
The Air Conservation Committee thereafter developed a plan for control 
of particulate matter. Within the plan, and to meet the requirement 
of emission control, was the Air Conservation Regulation 3.2. This 
plan was submitted to the administrator and approved by him, and is 
now enforceable by both the state and federal authorities. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The provisions of the Utah Air Conservation Act and the regu-
lations adopted pursuant thereto are valid and provide adequate 
constitutional safeguards to determine whether or not a violation 
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has occurred. The standards set forth in the Utah Air Conservation 
Act, Section 1.1.3 and Section 3/12 of the Visible Emission Regulations, 
Code of Air Conservation Regulations, are clear, reasonable and pro-
vide fair and adequate warnings to any violator thereof. These 
regulations provide a clear and accurate definition of "contaminant" 
sufficient for a determination to be made by administrative proce-
dure as to whether the "contaminant" does or does not become injur-
ious to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or property, 
or would unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or use 
of property." The definition of "contaminant" specifically excludes 
steam and water vapor. 
Each individual smoke reader testified that their opacity 
readings were taken beyond the "breakpoint" where the water vapor 
has dissipated and the dry contaminant continues skyward (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 95-97). A trained smoke reader can clearly determine the 
"breakpoint" of a wet plume when the water vapor evaporates (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 18-20, 73, 76-77, 95-97, 100-101, 120, 154, 185, 218-219; Vol. II, 
pp. 39, 178). Certified smoke readers receive field experience in 
addition to the smoke school to qualify to read wet plumes. 
The visual readings of the smoke reader at the smoke school 
are compared to precise readings monitored by an electric eye in 
order to calibrate his eyeball for making objective visual readings 
and to eliminate as much subjectivity as possible (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 13-26, 30-34). 
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Guidelines are set forth by the regulations of the Environmental 
Protection Agency for reading wet plumes. The trained smoke reader 
learns to calibrate his eyeballs and take appropriate readings beyond 
the breakpoint. The members of the staff who made the opacity 
readings on visible emissions received adequate field training to read 
smoke plumes containing water vapor (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 18, 24-25, 30-
31, 73-74, 95, 100-101, 156-157, 217-218; Vol. II, pp. 39, 178, 
183-189, 197-200). 
The appellant failed to show any discrepancy between "white" 
and "black" plumes. It has been shown that the smoke reader must 
calibrate his eyeballs to read the spacities of both black and white 
smoke in order to obtain certification (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 15-17, 40-42). 
Smoke readers are trained at the smoke school and through 
field experience to read dry and wet plumes. They are given certain 
guidelines about where to stand and under what conditions they are 
to read the plumes. The ideal conditions prescribed are not always 
possible, and therefore, the smoke reader must exercise his judgment 
in taking readings under the best conditions available under the 
existing circumstances. 
Some states have adopted regulations which take into account 
the fact that visible emissions readings may be taken under other than 
ideal conditions. For example, the Iowa rules adopted in Chapter 11, 
entitled "Qualification in Visual Determination of the Opacity of 
Emissions" in Section 11.1(2) under procedures reads, in part, as 
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follows: 
"For stationary sources, the qualified observer 
stands at a distance from the base of the stack necessary 
to obtain a clear view of the appropriate portion of 
the plume, with the sun to his back but not more than 
45° to either side. . . ." 
Iowa rules outline the qualifications for the observer in 
11.1(1), which states, in part, as follows: 
"To qualify as an observer in reading visible emissions, 
a candidate must complete a smoke reading course conducted 
by the department or an equivalent course. The smoke 
• generator used to qualify the observers must be equipped 
with a calibrated smoke indicator or light transmission 
meter located on the source stack if the smoke generator 
is to determine the actual opacity of the emissions." 
When a smoke reader takes his readings, the nature of the 
material and the type of process being employed by an industry have 
nothing to do with the accuracy of his reading. The trained smoke 
reader makes an eyeball calibrated reading of the opacity of the 
plume which can be appropriately measured, regardless of the pro-
cess, of the chemical and material employed. He is measuring 
the amount of dry particulate which is the by-product of the process, 
and such amount can be accurately measured in terms of its opacity 
in the plume released from the industry's stacks. The nature of 
the process and the materials used have no correlation with visible 
emissions readings and evaluations. In taking his readings, the 
smoke reader is not required to establish continuous violations. 
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The fact that he can measure a violation upon a single reading is 
sufficient to establish his burden of proof that a plant or indus-
try is emitting dry particulate in such a quantity as to cause a 
plume opacity beyond the permitted level of the visible emissions 
regulations. 
The readings taken by the smoke readers of the Fry Plant were 
after steam or water vapor dissipations. From the lip of the stack 
to the breakpoint, and even before the particulate reaches the lip 
of the stack, there is a dissolution factor which allows for dis-
persion of some of the particulate prior to the breakpoint. This 
dissolution factor gave for the Fry Plant an inherent advantage, 
in that the readings were taken beyond the breakpoint. (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 19, 20 and 28). 
The readings taken were accurate, in that the training and 
experience taught the smoke ,readers to take into account atmospheric 
conditions, including wind velocity, ambient temperature, atmos-
pheric pressure, humidity, cloud cover and position of the sun 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 13-26, 31-33, 74, 80-83, 117-121, 153-160, 217-221). 
The smoke readers presented testimony that bears directly on 
the issue of wet plume breakpoints, that is, where the steam or water 
vapor condenses and falls away, and where the dry contaminant continues 
skyward. Each observer pointed out that there was a definite break-
point and that it was easy to distinguish and read. For example, 
Mr. Bradford testified that they "(learned) to evaluate at the point 
there is that break between steam and particulate matter in the 
plume." (Vol. I, pp. 120) Mr. Rickers also testified, stating 
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the determination of where particulate separates from the water 
cloud was a fairly simple one. (Vol. I, p. 95) The points of 
evaluation by the "smoke readers" were made in accordance with their 
training and certification at right angles to the plume at proper 
distances with the sun to their backs. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 81-82, 
119-120, 149, 153-156, 217-221). 
Visual tests are accurate and may be considered as competent 
evidence upon which an order can be made (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 18-2 7; 
Vol. II, p. 178). There has been a showing of relative consistency 
in the readings of smoke readers with minimal subjective error 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 13-26). 
The appellant has failed to show that more sophisticated and 
accurate instruments provide for a better and more objective eval-
uation of alleged air contaminants than the visual tests by trained 
and qualified smoke readers. The smoke generator used to train a 
smoke reader has an electric eye to obtain exact measurements of 
opacity to compare with the visual readings of the smoke reader in 
order to calibrate his eyeball (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 21-41). No equivalent 
is available for evaluating or monitoring wet plumes (Tr. Vol. I, p. 47). 
Adequate records of the opacity readings were made by each 
smoke reader in writing with memoranda to Dr. Grant S. Winn for the 
business files of the Air Quality Section, Bureau of Environmental 
Health. Each smoke reader contacted the office of the Lloyd A. Fry 
Roofing Company prior to the taking of his readings. After the 
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readings were taken by the smoke readers, they contacted the office 
of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company to show Mr. Dan Springer and other 
officials the readings which were taken (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 60-64, 
102-104, 1-5, 110-113, 116, 134, 136-138, 143, 149-152, 163-180, 
192-194, 196-198, 201, 214, and p. 216; see Exhibits 4, 5, 9. 10, 
11, 12 and 14. 
The notes of the smoke readers were made available at the hear-
ing, in addition to the memoranda, and both the notes and the mem-
oranda were properly admitted and made a part of the record. 
The Air Quality Section held a meeting with the officials 
and legal counsel of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company and inspected 
the plant in Woods Cross on September 5, 1973 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 61-
64, 111, 112). Richard L. Harvey, Davis County Health Department, 
sent a letter to Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company on October 10, 1973, 
with regard to violations of Visible Emissions Regulations (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 151-152). Dr. Grant S. Winn, Executive Secretary, Utah Air 
Conservation Committee, issued his order dated January 16, 1974, 
notifying Mr. Donald Dc Foster of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company 
of the dates and the results of the opacity readings. 
The transcript of the hearing shows no evidence presented by 
the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company that the wet plumes from their com-
pany differ from other wet plumes. Smoke readers were trained to 
read wet plumes in order to qualify to make readings of the plumes 
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from the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company (Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, 24-25, 
30-31, 73-74, 95, 100, 101, 156-157, 217-218; Vol. II, p. 39, 178, 
173-179, 183-189, 197-200). 
Dr. Grant S. Winn, Chief of the Air Quality Section, Utah 
State Division of Health, was the first of many to testify as to 
the readibility of "wet" plumes. Dr. Winn possessed the most im-
pressive qualifications of any witness (Vol. I, p. 8) and has had 
extensive experience in teaching, government, and industry. His 
testimony concerning wet plume readings was that: 
"an experienced observer would have no difficulty 
in determining where the water could dissipate and 
the other particulate or other more particulate mat-
ter continues and an evaluation is made." (Vol. I, p. 20) 
Again, referring to the breakpoint, he said: 
"a very definite break *(occurs) when that steam plume 
dissipates. Very definite." (Vol. I, p. 30) 
It is interesting that two witnesses for the Lloyd A. Fry 
Company, Dr. Dale Parker and Mr. Donald Foster, testified concerning 
"wet" plume reading, yet neither were qualified smoke readers and 
neither had any previous experience in reading for opacity in visible 
emissions in plumes similar to those of the Fry process. Mr. Chaffin, 
the only qualified smoke reader presented by the defense, made his 
readings at the Fry plant on May 14, 1974, between noon and 1:00 p.m. 
At that time of day and year in this latitude, the sun would have 
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been in his eyes, clearly in violation of standard EPA procedure, 
and caused an inaccurate reading. 
Appellant argues that the breakpoint of a wet plume> where 
the uncombined water visibly separates from the particulate matter 
is impossible to determine, yet expert witnesses certified as smoke 
readers testified under oath that "an experienced observer would have 
no difficulty in determining /where or whether/ the water cloud 
dissipates and other particulate or other more particulate matter 
continues." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 20, 120, 154, 202, 218). A witness 
for the appellant agreed that the breakpoint can be read and one 
testified that he had often observed such a line of the Fry plume. 
Dr. Dale Parker, in his testimony, stated the following: 
" I think that in my observations passing the plant 
I have seen the breakpoint occasionally. But, it isnft 
there all the time, so »I have to conceive that point that 
it is possible for that moisture to break at times." 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 52) 
Dr. Parker went on further to testify as to a clear line of demarca-
tion for the break point. The transcript of the hearing indicates 
the following testimony: 
QUESTION (Mr. Hanson) 
ANSWER (Dr. Parker) 
And, you have just mentioned to one 
of the committee members that oc-
casionally you can have a clear 
demarcation, have you ever seen that? 
I have seen it in a lot of different 
stacks. You can see it in many or 
in a lot of different plumes around 
the valley. You can see it very 
definitely. I have seen a situation Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in the Fry plant where I could 
consider that to be a good break-
point. It isnft close to the stack. 
It's generally out a way." 
Dr. Dale Parker testified for the Lloyd A. Fry Company, yet 
his testimony clearly states that he has not been trained as a smoke \ 
reader and has not been certified to read wet plumes (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 247-248, 252). Dr. Parker never indicated in his experience at 
the Dugway Proving Grounds established no correlation with any 
processes similar to that of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company 
•(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 248-250) (He specifically stated that the plumes 
with which he worked at Dugway were other than steam plumes). 
The Air Conservation Committee had called Mr. Luedtke to 
testify. He gave his expert opinion based on facts and information 
supplied to him by the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company. Mr. Luedtke 
has a Bachelorfs Degree in Chemical Engineering from Oregon State 
University and a Master's Degree in Chemistry with Mechanical 
Engineering as a Minor from Washington State University. He cur-
rently holds a Certificate in Industrial Relations from UCLA and is 
a Registered Professional Mechanical Engineer and a Registered Meta-
lurgical Engineer in the State of California (Tr. Vol. II, p.167). 
Mr. Luedtke testified as to his experience with asphalt saturators, 
and that he had either run source tests or read smoke emissions 
and processed numerous applications for numerous plants in Los Angeles 
area (Tr. Vol. II, p. 169). He further testified to his experience 
with processes identical to the Fry Plant at Woods Cross (Tr. Vol. II-, 
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pp. 170-171). To determine the amount of dry particulate and the 
amount of water vapor which exits the stack of the Fry Company, Mr. 
Luedtke was supplied with the necessary plant information and data to 
ipake his computations (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 172-177, 183-185). Mr. 
Luedtke entered testimony to the effect that the opacity from steam 
plumes at the Fry Company can be read (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 193-194). 
He testified that he had personally read many plumes with the same 
operation as the Fry Roofing Company, where the opacity was well in 
excess of the Ringelmann No. 2 (Tr. Vol. II, p. 196). On cross-
examination Mr. Luedtke testified as to the identical process between 
Fry Roofing Compamy in Woods Cross and the celotex plant in Los 
Angeles, California (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 201-203). From the calcu-
lations and the psychometric chart, Mr. Luedtke came to the conclu-
sion that significant amounts of dry particulate were coming from 
the Fry stacks, in addition to the amount of water vapor which 
was dissipated. His testimony affirmed the position that smoke 
readers can make a determination of dry particulate by reading 
beyond the breakpoint (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 174-178, 183-187). 
The data furnished to Carl D. Luedtke was supplied by Mr. 
Mostyn and Mr. Donald Foster of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company. 
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 173-174) Mr. Luedtke's calculations were based 
upon ideal atmospheric conditions and he testified to scientific and 
experimental evidence which was framed within the reasonable proba-
bility, based upon sufficient preliminary facts, to make an expert 
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opinion (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 171-180). Mr. Luedtke compared his ob-
servations and calculations at the Lloyd A. Fry Company with similar 
asphalt roofing plants to arrive at his conclusions. He made 
reasonable inferences from his personal observations and communi-
cations with the officials of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company (Tr. Vol. II, 
pp. 193-203; Bol. I, pp. 223-225; Dr. Parker's testimony of similar 
processes at Dugway Proving Grounds). 
On September 5, 1973, Alvin Rickers, Brent Bradford and Lynn 
Price of the Air Quality Section were invited to visit the Fry Plant 
where they observed the operation of the plant. They observed the 
emissions from the process when the felt sheet was passing through 
the asphalt saturators, and also observed such emissions from the 
stacks when the felt sheet was "broken" or when the felt was not 
passing through the asphalt saturators. They compared the opacity 
of the emissions with the water vapor forced out of the felt and into 
the stack and the emissions when the felt was broken without moisture 
from the felt as part of the emissions. The result was an opacity 
reading of 35-40% with the felt broken and no water vapor being read 
with the emissions (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 65, 66, 87, 243-244, 259, 263). 
This sets forth the fact that the water vapor did not interfere with 
the taking of an opacity reading of the emissions and refutes the 
Fry position that the readings were of water vapor with its alleged 
masking effect on emissions. 
It also is interesting to notice that Donald Foster, who was 
called by the Fry Company, is in no position to make a determination 
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as to the opacity of the plume, since he is not a qualified smoke 
reader and has not had experience with visible emissions readings. 
Mr. Foster never took any readings of the opacity of the Fry plumes. 
He argued that the Fry Company was in compliance with the EPA 
Weight Emission Regulations; however, Fry is not charged under those 
regulations. No evidence was presented by the Fry Company to refute 
the visible emissions regulations of the Air Quality Section. 
On October 18, 1973, Mr. Donald Foster testified before the 
Utah Air Conservation Committee, where he stated that the Woods 
Cross plant is identical with all the other Fry Plants throughout 
the United States, which includes 24 other plants at different loca-
tions. The plume from the Fry Roofing Company at Woods Cross 
does not differ from plumes of other particulate and steam sources 
as far as the visual evaluation is concerned. It can be determined 
where the steam ceases to be a part of the plume and the evaluations, 
all made beyond this point, include opacity caused by particulates 
alone. 
The testimony of Mr. Foster, with regard to uncombined water, 
made sense. He testified as follows: 
"Oil and water does not mix. We have uncombined 
water in our plume. We have a physical mixture,- yes, 
going up the stack, but at some point out here, all 
of the water evaporates. The gas as it is driven off 
or the plume as it is driven off as a gas condenses. 
It may be a particulate at that time, but itfs clear 
out here at some point well beyond the lip of the 
stack from 30 to 100 feet, at least." (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 158). 
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Mr. Foster further testified that no uncombined water was observable 
in the plume at the Fry Roofing Company. If this is the case, then 
the entire plume would have to be composed of particulate matter. 
This would place Fry Roofing Company all the more clearly in direct 
violation of the Visible Emissions Regulations. 
It is interesting to note that all of the states in the United 
States have visible emissLons regulations. It is further interesting 
to note the Idaho regulations for the control of smoke and visible 
emissions. Section 4 of the "Regulation for Control of Smoke and • 
Other Visible Emissions" for the state of Idaho reads as follows: 
"The density or opacity of an air contaminant 
shall be measured at the point of its emission, if 
observable, and if not, shall be measured at an ob-
servable point on the plume nearest the point of 
emission. When water particulate contributes to the 
opacity of a visible emission, the measurement shall 
be made immediately beyond the point where the 
water particulate dissipates and no longer contri-
butes to the opacity." 
Thos emission regulation obviously sets forth the principle of 
a dissipation or breakpoint in wet plumes. The State of South 
Carolina adopted Regulation No. 2.6, entitled "Air Pollution Control 
Standards—Standard No. I—Smoke Emission." Section I of this 
regulation deals with existing sources, and Section II deals with new 
sources. Section 1(B) reads as follows: 
"Smoke, exclusive of condensed water vapor, from 
fuel burning shall not obscure an observer's view to 
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a degree as great as or greater than does smoke 
designated as No. 1 on the Ringelmann Chart." 
Once again, the South Carolina statute makes a clear distinction 
that a smoke reader can observe a defined breakpoint, exclusive 
of condensed water vapor, at which he can make a visible emission 
reading. The State of Texas adopted a visible emissions regulation 
under Rule 103 of the Texas "Regulation I Control of Air Pollution 
from Smoke, Visible Emissions and Particulate Matter." Rule 103.7 
reads as follows: 
"Contributions from uncombined water shall not 
be included in determining compliance with Rule 103. 
The burden of proof which establishes the applicability 
of Rule 103.7 shall be upon the person seeking to come 
within its provisions." 
You will notice from the Texas regulation that uncombined water 
can be separated from the dry particulate in making a visible 
emission reading. It is the burden of proof of the person charged 
to come forward to establish that he is in compliance with the 
regulation. 
Finally, Mr. Raymond L. Chaffin was also called to testify 
by the Fry Company, yet he denied his own expertise in reading 
wet plumes. Mr. Chaffin indicated that he could only read dry plumes 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 71). He indicated that he had not been trained 
at the EPA school; therefore, he was in no position to make a deter-
mination that Fry was in compliance with Section 312 of the Visible 
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Emissions Regulations (Tr. Vol. II, p. 73). Mr. Chaffin's 
readings at the Fry plant were made, as mentioned before, when the 
sun was in his eyes, in direct violation of the standard procedure 
prescribed by the Environmental Protection Agency (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 86,92) . This would have made any readings he had taken inaccurate, 
because the sun was in his eyes and not at the appropriate angle for 
taking his readings. Mr. Chaffin further testified that the steam 
coming from the stack condenses immediately to water and that, the 
plume is composed entirely of steam (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 102-103). 
This would indicate that no plume could, in fact, exist. If a 
plume were to be observed beyond the condensation point out of the 
stacks of the Fry plant, their plumes would have to be composed 
of dry particulate to satisfy the explanation given by Mr. Chaffin. 
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POINT I 
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE HAS MET ITS 
BURDEN IN PROVING THAT THE LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING 
COMPANY HAS VIOLATED SECTION 3.2 OF THE VISIBLE 
EMISSIONS REGULATIONS. 
The decision of the Utah Air Conservation Committee was based 
upon a finding of substantial evidence introduced at the hearing. 
It found that contaminant was discharged into the atmosphere, and 
that such contaminant was either of a shade as dark or darker than 
a Ringelmann No. 2 or that it obstructed the vision of smoke readers 
at least as much as would the smoke that was as dark as a Ringelmann 
No. 2. 
In People v. Plywood Manufacturers of California, 137 Cal. App. 
2d Supp. 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955), the court held that the burden of 
proof in prosecution of a violation was upon the state. The elements 
of proof were held to be as follows: 
"(1) that it was a contaminant that was discharged into 
the atmosphere, and (2) that the contaminant was either 
(a) of a shade as dark or darker than Ringelmann No. 2, 
or (b) that it obstructed the vision at least as much 
as would smoke that was as dark as Ringelmann No. 2." 
Id., at 594. 
In this case, the Superior Court of California held that the "anti-
smog" statute was not invalid because of objections urged against it. 
It also decided that the word "opacity" in the statute meant "want of 
transparency." 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee is not required to establish 
a continuous violation, but rather that violations were observed on 
the different days listed by the various smoke readers. In People v. 
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International Steel Corporation, 102 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 935, 226 
P.2d 587 (1951), the court held the above-mentioned standard was 
sufficiently definite to satisfy the due process of law. 
Furthermore, in Plywood Manufacturing, supra, the court saw 
no difficulty arising from the fact that a plume of smoke may 
appear less dark than Ringelmann No. 2 from one position, but 
darker from another viewpoint. They held that if the contaminant 
has the substance that, fairly viewed from any position, gives it 
a shade as dark or darker than Ringelmann No. 2, it is condemned, 
no matter how light in color it may look to someone situated at 
another vantage point* Supra, at 591. 
Each individual state has the responsibility of implementing 
certain air quality standards described in the National Evniron-
mental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §1847 c-2 (a) . In compliance with 
this federal directive, the Utah State Implementation Plan set forth 
certain emission limitations. In accordance with E.P.A. procedures, 
the smoke readers made objective readings and complied with the re-
quirements of due process. Each and every reader found numerous 
violations of the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company on the date in ques-
tion and testified as to their procedure in taking these readings. 
They were taken under the best conditions which were available on the 
dates in question. 
Each reader testified that at the time the readings were taken, 
they had no difficulty in ascertaining where the breakpoint was, and 
that their readings were made of the contaminant which continued 
when the plume was free of uncombined water. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In State v. Lloyd A, Fry Roofing Company, 9 Ore. App. 189, 
495 P. 2d 751 (1972), remanded on other grounds, Ore. _, 
502 P. 2d 253 (1972), opinion reinstated in full, Ore. App. , 
502 P. 2d 1162 (1972), the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company was indicted 
on four counts of air pollution in violation of the rules of the 
local air pollution agency. The court held that the evidence con-
cerning the defendant's alleged violations was correctly assessed, 
and applicable statutes and regulations were properly interpreted. . 
The court further held that the state's evidence in the form of 
testimony and records of the smoke readers, certified as such just 
prior to making the readings in question, was admissible, and such 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. The court held 
that the two witnesses held sufficient qualifications to determine 
obscuration of background caused by emissions from defendant's plant. 
The decision further stated the law does not require that in 
order to qualify as an expert, the witness be better qualified than 
anyone else, but only that he has sufficient expertise to make it 
probable that he will aid the jury in its search for truth. The 
trial court's determination as to whether a witness is competant will 
not be upset, except upon a clear abuse of discretion. 
In the case at bar, there has been no showing of any clear abuse 
of discretion, the same as in the Oregon case above cited. The Ore-
gon case showed that there was no clear abuse of discretion in admit-
ting evidence of smoke readings made by two agency employees who had 
undergone two days' training and had been certified just shortly 
before making the readings, even though the plume at the defendant's Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plant was a "wet" plume. The readers had only been given practical 
training in reading "dry" plumes, receiving only instruction on the 
reading of "wet" ones. In the instant case, the Utah readers had 
been throughly trained, certified, and had years of experience in 
reading both types of plumes. No cases have indicated the amount of 
experience, training or education which is required to establish the 
competency of the witnesses. 
In the instant case, no testimony was given about the variables 
which may affect a smoke reading, nor was there testimony offered to 
refute the results of the smoke reader's findings. The Utah smoke 
readers were subjected to many variables during their smoke school 
training, and received detailed instruction on wet plumes. 
Basic or essential findings upon which administrative orders 
rest must be clearly and completely shown in findings based on 
substantial evidence. Cities Service Gas Company v. State Corporation 
Commission, 201 Kan. 223, 440 P.2d 660 (1968). The finding of the 
Utah Air Conservation Committee was based upon substantial evidence 
as set forth at the hearing. The Committee was authorized to issue 
such orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of the 
Air Conservation Act and to enforce the same by all appropriate ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings. See, Section 26-24-5. This 
was an administrative hearing which resulted in a final order being 
issued by the committee to the appellant to either .seek a variance 
as outlined in the act or cease and desist. This action was based 
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upon a finding of substantial evidence. 
The question of whether or not there was presented to an admin-
istrative agency in a quasi-judicial proceeding sufficient evidence 
of a violation of rules and regulations pertaining to air pollution 
as would warrant the issuance by the agency of an order to cease and 
desist or otherwise abate the violative practices is the real ques-
tion. The decision of an administrative tribunal must be supported 
by evidence of probative value, and if such evidence is apparent 
to a review in court, the court will not substitute its own judicial deter-
mination on the facts. See 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec-
tion 393. As proof of the violation itself, it has been held that 
a preponderance of the evidence, and not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, is all that is required. See North American Coal Corporation 
v
- Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cnwlth. 469, 279 A.2d 365 (1971). 
Where an administrative agency is concerned with technical matters, 
the court will give weight to its presumed expertise in reviewing 
decisions, and stating as applicable the rule that the court will 
not overturn an administrative decision if it appears to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record. Evidence consisting of 
testimony by several witnesses who live near the defendant manufac-
turing plant that fumes and smoke coming from the plant had caused 
them poor health and discomfort, along with the testimony of an 
expert witness who was the enforcement officer for the commission 
as to certain observations and tests made upon several occasions 
-29-
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at the manufacturing plant was held sufficient in Department of 
Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 100 N.J. Super. 366, 
242 A.2d 21 (1968),Affirmed, 53 N.J. 248, 250 A.2d 11 (1970). 
The court, in North American Coal, supra, stated that when 
visual tests are used to determine the amount of emission, great 
pains should be taken to make sure that the tests are made accu-
rately and fairly and that sufficient proof to sustain the opinions 
of the experts is presented. This court took the positon that the 
comparitive degree of proof by which a case must be determined in 
an administrative hearing is the same as in a civil judicial pro-
ceeding; that is, a preponderance of the evidence, and notwith-
standing that the defendant was charged with a violation of the 
commission's regulations, proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not 
be required. It also concluded that visual tests do constitute 
admissible evidence sufficient to warrant the granting of an abate-
ment order. 
In Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 111. App. 3d 711, 
292 N.E.2d 540 (1973), the appellate court held that penalty powers 
given the Pollution Control Board of the State of Illinois weyre 
incidental to its duties of administering the Environmental Control 
Act and did not constitute a prohibited grant of judicial power. 
In this decision the appellate court held that an administrative 
officer or agency may penalize, without offending the constitution, 
when the penal function is incidental to the duty of administering 
the law. The Illinois Environmental Control Act provisions authorize 
the imposition of penalties by the Pollution Control Board and do not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
deprive the penalized party of its constitutional right to a jury 
trial (see argument V). It is essential to note that the Illinois 
statute on violations and penalties is similar to the section in 
the Utah Code. In the proceedings for the enforcement of the 
Environmental Control Act, the court held that the board need only 
establish a prima facie case of violation and does not have an addi-
tional burden of introducing proof relative to each of the factors 
contained in the statutes setting forth what the board shall con-
sider in making its orders and determinations. Where the board has 
made a prima facie case of violation of the Environmental Control 
Act, the alleged violator has the burden of going forward to estab-
lish the reasonableness of the emissions, discharges or deposits. 
The court went on to state that it was not necessary for the commis-
sion or board to make particular findings as to every evidentiary 
fact or claim, and it was sufficient that findings were made which 
were adequate to support the order of the board, and that such 
findings had substantial foundation in evidence. It is interesting 
to note that the burden of proof of the reasonableness of the emissions, 
discharges or deposits rests with the defendant; or in this case, 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company. 
In the case of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Pollution 
Control Board, 20 111. App.3d 301, 314 N.E.2d 350 (1974), the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the charges in the adminis-
trative proceeding need not be drawn with the same refinement as 
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pleadings in a court of law, but the charges must be sufficiently 
clear and specific to allow preparation of a defense. The court 
further held that the compliance with the regulations of the Pol-
lution Control Board is a prima facie defense to charges of viola-
ting the act, but is not a complete defense. The Lloyd A. Fry 
Roofing Company made no attempt, in the instant case, to estab-
lish compliance with the regulations of the State. The appellate 
court, in the Illinois decision, found that the Lloyd A. Fry 
Company had causedair pollution as defined by the act and had emit-
ted particulates into the air in amounts exceeing the limits set 
forth in the rules and regulations governing control of air pollution. 
The Pollution Control Board of Illinois made its determination 
after due consideration of written and oral statements, testimony 
and arguments submitted at hearing. The court held that its posi-
tion is to examine the findings of the administrative agency to 
determine if they are supported by sufficient competent evidence. 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee submits that this is the duty 
of the Utah Supreme Court, to review the findings of the Committee 
to make a determination if they are supported by sufficient and 
competent evidence. 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee is not required to show 
that injury to an individual or members of the public has occurred. 
The purpose of the Visible Emissions Regulations adopted by the 
Utah Air Conservation Committee is to assure that the Federal Ambient 
Air Standards are not violated in order to assure that human health 
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is protected. The burden of the committee is merely to show that 
a public right has been invaded, namely, the right to breathe clean 
air. The public right threatened with this kind of an invasion 
must be substantial. The case of City of Chicago, et. al. v. 
Gunning System, 214 111. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905) declared as 
unreasonable an ordinance which controlled the use of billboards. 
The court, in the form of dictum, stated: 
"The one essential and universal limitation upon the 
exercise of the police power is, however, that the 
regulation shall be reasonably necessary and reason-
ably exercised." IcL , at 1040. 
The court also stated as follows: 
"In determining first whether this act is a 
constitutional exercise of the police power, we 
are cognizant that the criteria of a proper exer-
cise of the police power, that inherent and plenary 
power of the legislature to protect public health, 
safety and general welfare, . .
 # is whether the 
statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils 
which the legislature has determined exist." 
The court emphasized the theory that the public possesses a trust 
in natural resources. Whenever the environment is degraded, a 
public right (public trust) has been invaded. 
Section 26-24-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), states 
the definition of "air pollution" to be a condition in the ambient air 
where air contaminants in such quantities and duration and under cer-
tain conditions and circumstances tend to be injurious to human 
health or welfare. The Utah Air Conservation Committee has set 
forth certain visible emissions regulations to insure the public 
that contaminant levels will not get to a point where they will 
be injurious to human health or welfare. The smoke readers observed Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the opacity of the smoke plumes of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company 
to be emitting contaminants to a level beyond the emission 
limitations. These readings, in and of themselves, set forth a 
prima facie case that the emissions from the Lloyd A, Fry plant 
are at a level which tend to be injurious to human health or 
welfare. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE 
UTAH AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE ARE BASED UPON 
SUBSTANTIAL AND FACTUAL EVIDENCE WHICH PROVIDED 
THE LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY WITH ADEQUATE 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THE DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW. 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee made its determination 
after due consideration of written and oral statements, testi-
mony and arguments submitted at the hearing. The administrative 
procedure allowed the hearing officers to make a determination 
and appraise the evidence. In State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing 
Company, supra, the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that the 
air pollution authority's intent to define the term "opacity11 
as the reduction of transmitted light and obscuraction of back-
ground, including the concept of "equivalent opacity," meaning 
white smoke which obscures more than 40% of the background is 
equivalent to smoke as dark or darker in shade as that designated 
in No. 2 on the Ringelmann Chart (used to measure black or gray 
smoke), and such rules, were not so vague and arbitrary as to 
violate constitutional standards controlling the validity of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such legislation. There was no clear abuse of discretion in 
admitting evidence of smoke readings made by the two agency 
employees recently certified as smoke readers, even though the 
plume at the Fry plant was a "wet" plume and the reader's 
instruction had not been practical, but theoretical. The decision 
clearly held that there is no need for experience in reading 
wet plumes in order to make one's determination as to the opacity 
of dry particulate out of such plumes. 
The appellants allege in their brief that there was no 
showing that the operation at the Oregon plant was the same as 
that of the Woods Cross plant, in reference to the above-cited 
case. The fact is that the Lloyd A. Fry Company has 24 plants 
in the United States, all of which are identical in process and 
operation with the Woods Cross plant. Mr. Donald Foster testi-
fied to this at the Utah Air Conservation Committee meeting on 
October 18, 1973. 
In this same Oregon decision, the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Com-
pany challenged the Columbia-Williamette Air Pollution Authority 
in that their regulations were vague and arbitrary, so as to vio-
late the constitutional standards controlling the validity of such 
legislation.^ The court interpreted the concept of equivalent 
opacity to be constitutional. The Lloyd A. Fry Company made the 
argument that equivalent opacity measures one factor only, of a 
definition which requires that two factors be considered. These 
factors were the transmission of light and the background visibility. 
The court interpreted the definition of opacity to mean both: the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reduction of light and obscuration of background. The court 
further held that this was the agency's clear intent and upheld 
the equivalent opacity to be constitutional. 
Another concern that the appellant in the instant case has 
expressed is the alleged subjectivity of the procedure involved. 
Each of the state's smoke readers has been trained, certified, 
and retrained in smoke schools offered by the state. Each had 
qualified under strict federal standards (40 C.F.R. 60) and had 
passed the tests for certification. Each smoke reader has further 
received field training to become specialized and skilled in 
reading "wet" plumes, as well as dry. 
The fact that a difference in readings has occurred does not 
destroy the validity of each individual reading. Appellant 
equates individuality with subjectivity. This is fallacious rea-
soning. Of course, each official or smoke reader, being an indiv-
idual would have unique background, experience, and perception. That 
is why the consistency of the observed violations on many different 
occasions by five different men is so remarkable. It testifies 
affirmatively about the smoke school training and the vast experi-
ence of these men. 
A building inspector may detect a warp in a wall, roof, or a 
foundation which an ordinary person would not have seen; yet it may 
be potentially harmful to those occupying the building, or a meat 
inspector may notice a slight discoloration in a cut of beef that 
would render it harmful to human life, yet he is just one of many 
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inspectors. Does this mean that his visual perceptions are suspect 
or that new and expensive equipment is required? No. 
There was nothing even remotely haphazard or unskilled about 
the manner in which the evaluations by the statefs observers were 
made. Evidence was presented as to the experience of each one and 
it was never challenged. The readings were done in a reasonable 
and fair fashion. E?ch observer testified that he took into account 
the numerous variables that could have altered the accuracy of his 
record. 
The readings of the various smoke readers indicated that they 
read the plume at right angles and with the sun at their backs as 
much as would permit for best conditions to make the readings. The 
transcript of the hearing indicated that Richard Harvey read the 
plume at right angles (Tr. Vol. I, p.153) and that William Terburg 
also read the plume at right angles (Tr. Vol. 1/ pp.120, 149). 
George Chlarson appears to have been the most capable individual 
at reading smoke as a result of his qualifications at the smoke 
school. He read 25 consecutive readings without error (Tr. Vol. 
I, pp. 72-73) . In the testimony of William Terburg, there was no 
showing that the sun was not to his back, and, in fact, he testi-
fied that the sun probably had no effect on his reading. Al Rickers, 
who is a qualified meteorolgist, testified as to his extensive ex-
perience in taking 150 to 175 readings of smoke plumes (Tr. Vol I., 
p. 56) Mr. Rickers further testified that the student who qualifies 
at the smoke school have a reading variation which runs about 1% 
or less from the exact meter readings (Tr. Vol. I, p. 55). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Each reader in this case was certified and complied with pro-
cedure by presenting an appropriate Fry Company official with 
notice of violation, and each properly recorded, in memorandum 
form, the details of the observations for future reference. , 
No evidence was presented by the appellant to show that this 
regular procedure was ineffective or that the observers required, 
re-calibration of their eyeballs at the time of their readings* 
The current procedure is reliable and eminently satisfactory. 
It should be evident that the smoke plumes which the inspec-
tors observed are not, and are not required to be, evidence in this 
case. Rather, the evidence which was available to the state here 
and in all cases with reppect to visible emission violations would 
consist of the inspector's trained observations and his field 
report whereon he recorded all the elements necessary for an accur-
ate opacity reading. 
In the City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 
3 Ore. App. 352, 472 P.2d 826 (1970) the defendant then, as does 
the appellant now, claimed subjectivity in enforcement; that the 
"guilt or innocence of defendant (was) dependent upon the whims 
and vagaries of opinion testimony produced by officers of the 
enforcing agencies.11 Supra, at 828. The court found this contention, 
invalid, unpersuasive, and firmly rejected it. 
%he court, in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Pollution Con-
trol Board, supra, held that the Environmental Protection Act of 
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Illinois was not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite for failure 
to scientifically delineate all types of contaminants and pollution. 
Rather, it held that the authority and power bestowed on the Pollu-
tion Control Board to make rules and adjudicate cases are in keeping 
with the spirit of the act, for practical application and operation 
of the act, and that the act did not confer unlimited jurisdictional 
discretion, and judicial power upon the Board, inasmuch as discre-
tion and power is clearly limited by statutory requirement that the 
Board determine standards. The court went on to say that the Environ-
mental Protection Act of Illinios was not applied in a capricious or 
arbitrary manner on the theory that the actions for violations of 
the act could be brought against persons, even though they may be in 
compliance with regulations and even though the Act states that com-
pliance with regulations is a prima facie defense to an action, in 
view of the provision of the act that violations of it occur whenever 
a person causes or tends to cause air pollution "or" violates the 
rules and regulations adopted by the Pollution Control Board. 
With regard to the issues of evidence, the Court held that 
failure to observe the technical rules of evidence was not suffi-
cient reason to set aside an administrative agency's decision un-
less the error materially affected the rights of the party and re-
sulted in substantial injustice to him. The court stated that the 
admission of incompetent evidence before the Pollution Control 
Board is not reversible error if there is substantial evidence to 
sustain the decision. On the other hand, the court held that the 
Pollution Control Board's finding of air pollution by the manufac-
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turer of the a'sphalt roofing in violation of the Environmental 
Protection Act was supported by substantial, competent evidence 
showing unreasonable interference with life and property. In the 
case at bar, the Utah Air Conservation Committee took into consid-
eration all the facts and circumstances from the hearing upon the 
reasonableness of the emissions and found that the Lloyd A. Fry 
Company had failed to demonstrate any compliance with the Visible 
Emissions Regulations and that they further caused the emission 
of contaminants to the extent to be beyond the emissions limita-
tions set forth by the Utah Air Conservation Committee. 
The appellant brings forward the case of Bortz Coal Company 
v. Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cmwlth. 441, 279 A.2d 388 (1971). 
Actually, the Bortz decision is highly favorable to the State. The 
court rejected contentions that the pollution statute constituted 
an unlawful delegation of legislative authority and that the 
enforcement of the rules and regulations was a confiscation of pro-
perty without the due process of law. It found that the evidence 
was not sufficient to uphold an abatement order. The facts, how-
ever, quickly demonstrate the difference between the Bortz case 
and the one before this court. Of the four witnesses in the Bortz 
decision, two were housewives who complained of dirt and soot, and 
only one was an air pollution expert. There was no indication in 
the record that he was qualifed as a smoke reader. He had made 
observations from which he not only asserted an opacity violation, 
. — -» 
-40-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but also claimed the coke ovens in question emitted more than 45 
pounds of particulate matter per hour from each oven. The smoke 
emitted was black; therefore, a Ringelmann Chart could have been 
useful, while in the instant case, the observers were reading 
white plumes. The chart would not have added anything to the 
accuracy in any scientific manner, since the readers were deter-
mining an equivalent opacity, on the Fry stacks. The Bortz abate-
ment order was based on the casual observation of one employee. 
The order of the Utah Air Conservation Committee was based not only 
upon the careful observations of trained and recertified smoke 
readers, but expert testimony as to their abilities and capabilities. 
Appellants further sited the case of Portland Cement v. Ruckel-
shaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C# Cir. 1973). The Portland Cement decision 
relied on by appellant Fry Roofing Company to question the visible 
observation method can easily be distinguished. The court was 
addressing itself to a proposed Environmental Protection Agency 
10% opacity standard for new stationary sources of particulate 
matter, while in the instant case the concern before this court is 
a violation by an existing stationary source of a more liberal amount 
or standard of 40% for existing sources. The court also seemed to 
express the belief that the present opacity standard of at least 20% 
(for new sources) was quite reliable and only expressed concern for 
reasonable accuracy at minimal levels at or below 10%. This same 
argument applies to the additional decision cited by appellant in 
Essex Chemical v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir". 1973). 
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POINT III 
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION ACT PROVIDES FOR 
ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Smoke control regulations, whether directly prohibiting the 
emission of smoke or regulating the supply and use of smoke-
producing fuel, have ordinarily been held valid as a proper exer-
cise of the police power* The typical smoke regulation is regarded 
as reasonable and does not violate due process or constitutional 
provisions against discriminatory legislation or, applied to inter-
state or foreign commerce, the Commerce Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution. The terms used in smoke control regulations, such as 
"dense smoke" or a reference to the Ringelmann Chart as published 
by the United States Bureau of Mines (defining degrees of darkness) 
are not so indefinite as to render the regulation invalid. 
Regulations for the control of the emission of smoke or the 
use of smoke-creating fuel, have ordinarily been held valid, or 
at least, not invalid on their face. The general rule is that 
the question of the reasonableness of an act otherwise within con-
stitutional bounds is for the legislature exclusively, and that in 
ordinary cases the courts have no revisory power concerning it nor 
any power to substitute their own opinion for the judgment of the 
legislature. The courts inquire whether a statute is arbitrary or 
capricious, that is, whether it is reasonably necessary and appro-
priate for the accomplishment of the legitimate objects falling 
within the scope of the police power of the state,"then the validity 
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of the exercise of such power is valid. Statutes, ordinances, and 
administrative rules and regulations (issued under the authority of 
appropriate statutes), dealing with the control of smoke or other 
air pollution, have ordinarily been held reasonable, or at least, 
not unreasonable on their face. State ex reL Hainsworth v. Shannon, 
130 Mo. App. 90, 108 S.W. 1097 (1908); Rochester v. Macauley-Fien 
Milling Company, 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910); People v. Tadge, 
203 Misc. 949, 121 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Alle-
gheny County v. Toth, 189 Pa. Super. 552, 152 A.2d 284 (1959). 
Smoke control regulations have ordinarily been held not to 
violate the due process clauses of the Federal and State Consti-
tutions. This is so, even though such a regulation disturbs the 
full enjoyment of a personal right without providing compensation 
therefor. Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942); 
State v. Chicago, M.& St.Pr.Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911). 
It is a general principle of statutory law that a statute must be 
definite to be valid. A statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion violates the first essential of the due process of law. Regu-
lations for the control of smoke and other forms of air pollution 
have been upheld against the attack that their language was so vague 
and indefinite as to deprive the regulations of their validity. 
People v. International Steel Corporation, supra; People v. Plywood 
Manufacturers of California, supra. In the case of People v. Plywood 
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smog" statute was constitutionally valid and satified the demands 
of due process because the legislature, in drafting the statute, 
took the sound premise that smoke that was as dark or darker than 
Ringelmann No. 2 obstructed the view to an identifiable degree that 
would serve as a standard for the statute. 
In People v. International Steel Corporation, supra, the court 
held that the statute for the control of air pollution, which pro-
hibits the discharge into the atmosphere from any single source of 
emission, within certain time limits, of smoke "as dark or darker 
in shade as that designated in No. 2 on the Ringelmann Chart, as 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Mines," was held not subject to the 
objection that it was fatally uncertain because it set forth no 
ascertainable standard of guilt. A definition of density or dark-
ness of smoke by reference to the Ringelmann Chart published by the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines is not subject to the objection that it is in-
valid on the ground of vagueness. The court in both cases rejected 
the contention that the statute was unconstitutional because the 
ordinary person, having no special training, would not be able to 
tell whether his smoke is as dark as Ringelmann No. 2 or whether its 
opacity equals that of smoke that matches Ringelmann No. 2. The 
court pointed out that while a statute is invalid if its terms 
leave that which it attempts to control shrouded in uncertainty, a 
statute which declares an act identified with certainty to be un-
lawful, is not rendered unconstitutional because the act, as a fact, 
may not be readily identifiable by the common man as "that forbidden 
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of the facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed 
and the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality 
is cast upon the assailant. Board of Health v. New York Central 
Railroad Company, 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950). 
Regulations of smoke and other forms of air pollution have 
ordinarily been held not to violate the constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws or restricting spe-
cial legislation nor to be otherwise discriminatory so as to be 
invalid. People v. International Steel Corporation, supra. A 
smoke control regulation is not discriminatory so as to be invalid 
where it applies to all coming within its terms. A smoke control 
statute is not discriminatory because under it one who discharges 
an air contaminant only slightly below the prescribed limit of color 
copacity is exempt from the prohibition, even though if he continues 
his operation long enough he will discharge more contaminant into 
the air than one who continues for only a short time beyond the 
three-minute minimum permitted in the statute. People v. International 
Steel Corporation, supra. 
The discretion exercised by a legislature within its power is 
not subject to judicial control unless it involves a violation of 
some right protected by the constitution, a fundamental right. In 
this respect, courts have pointed out that a statute for the control 
of air pollution is a proper exercise of the police power with the 
discretion of the administrative body enforcing it, and that an act 
of the legislature is not to be declared void by the court unless the 
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violation of the constitution leaves no room for reasonable doubt. 
St. Louis v, Edward Heitzberg Packing and Provision Company, 141 Mo. 
375, 42 S.W. 954 (1897); Atlantic City v. France, 75 N.-J.L. 910, 
70 A. 163 (1908). The courts have shifted the burden to the defendant 
to prove the unreasonableness of an ordinance or regulation. Pre-
sumption is in favor of the validity of such rule or regulation, 
and the defendant has the burden to establish it as unreasonable. 
The defendant has a further burden to show the impossibility of his 
compliance with such ordinance. People v. Tadje, supra; Cincinnati 
v. Miller, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 788, 29 W.L. Bull. 364 (1893); 
Oswald v. Christy, 112 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1952 Supp.) 
A statute ia the State of California, referring to "excessive 
smoke" was held not so indefinite, uncertain and vague that it 
failed to inform an average, intelligent person what acts or omis-
sions are prohibited, or to fix any standard of guilt, since the 
requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of 
ordinary terms to express ideas of common usage. The visible 
emissions regulations are much clearer than the definition of 
"excessive smoke" used in the California statute, and yet the 
"excessive smoke" statute was held to be constitutional and within 
the perameters of due process of law. Myriads of cases have upheld 
the validity of the use of the Ringelmann Chart in ascertaining the 
opacity of a smoke plume. A county Pollution control ordinance was 
not held unconstitutional where there was a definite relationship 
between public health and welfare being protected under the ordin-
ance regulating pollutant discharges into the atmosphere, and where 
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standards setting forth maximum allowable emission of smoke and 
particulate matter, including the use of the Ringelmann Chart, 
were easily ascertainable from the language of the Code. Miami 
v. Coral Gables, 230 2nd So.7 (Fla. App. 1969). In a Michigan 
decision, the ambiguity in the definition of "smoke" in the city 
air pollution control ordinance would not bar its application 
where the defendant's smoke emissions were fcund to be darker 
than permissible, comparing them with the Ringelmann Chart density 
No. 2. People v. Detroit Edison Company, 16 Mich. App. 423, 168 
N.W. 2d 320 (1969); Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution Commission, 
supra. Lloyd A. Fry Company v. Department of Health, 179 Colo. 223, 
499 P.2d 1176 (1972) held that the smoke control regulations of the 
State of Colorado do not violate the due process of law. The court 
upheld the validity of the regulations against an attack that the 
language is so vague and indefinite as to rob the regulations of 
their validity. In City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Com-
pany, supra, the city ordinance using the Ringelmann Chart as the 
standard in controlling air contamination was constitutional. It 
established a standard of guilt ascertainable to persons of common 
intelligence, contained standards likely or calculated to produce 
uniform application, and did not make guilt or innocence of the 
defendant dependent upon whims and vagaries of opinion testimony 
produced by officers of the enforcing agency. In the same case, 
the definition of opacity by the air pollution authority, in terms 
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merely stated the same concept in two ways, as previously mentioned. 
In the above-cited cases, the equivalent opacity method did not 
require the use of the Ringelmann Chart in the field, because the 
chart was designed for black smoke and the observer at the smoke 
school is also trained to read the equivalent opacity of white 
smoke. Reading equivalent opacity without the aid of the Ringelmann 
Chart is a valid method of reading smoke plumes. State v. Lloyd A. 
Fry Roofing Company, supra, at 753-754. 
Finally, in the decision of Department of Health v. Owens-
Corning Fiberqlas Corporation, supra, the New Jersey Air Pollution 
Control Act was held to be not invalid, in that it lacked speci-
ficity in failing to inform the defendant with particularity as to 
the nature of the offending activity where such activity was "air 
pollution11 which was properly defined in the act. 
It is interesting to take notice that all states have visible 
emission statutes similar to those of the State of Utah, and none 
of these statutes has ever been declared unconstitutional. The 
violation of Section 3.2.1 of the Visible Emissions Regulations 
does not create an "irrebuttable presumption," rather a rebuttable one 
is presented. The rebuttable presumption is that the degree of 
opacity in the Fry plumes, when darker than Ringelmann No. 2 (40% 
opacity) is proof that "air pollution" exists. Section 3.2.6(d) 
allows for the exception of uncombined water. This allows the 
aggrieved party great latitude to present evidence that water vapor 
formed a portion of the observed plume, as in this case. The appel-
lant, however, has failed to establish this burden of proof. Fry 
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Company has neglected to present even a single case to support its 
bold assertion of unconstitutionality. Since every state in the 
country has visible emission statutes, the dearth of case law 
favoring the Fry position speaks resoundingly against it. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION ACT IS A LAWFUL DELE-
GATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER TO THE 
UTAH AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF CARRYING OUT ITS ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. 
Since administrative agencies are purely creatures of legis-
lation, without inherent or common-law powers, the general rule 
applied to statutes granting powers to them is that only those 
powers are granted which are conferred either expressly or by 
necessary implication. State v. Goss, 79 Utah 599, 111 P.2d 340 
(1932). Statutes authorizing the State Board of Health to make 
rules limited to matters respecting duties imposed upon the board 
with respect to particular subjects or situations are held valid. 
Id. Where administrative powers are granted for the purpose of 
effectuating broad regulatory programs which are deemed to be essen-
tial to the public welfare, interpretive attention may concentrate on 
remedial character of the legislation to produce a liberal interpre-
tation that enables the full benefits of the program to be realized. 
This approach has been taken consistently with respect to the statutes 
granting powers to boards of health. 3 Southerland, Statutory Con-
struction, 4th Ed. §65.03. The public and social purposes served 
by health legislation greatly exceeds the inconvenience and hard-
ship imposed upon the individual, and therefore, the former is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
given greater* emphasis in the problems of interpretation* The courts 
are inclined to give health statutes liberal interpretation despite 
the fact that such statutes may be penal in nature and frequently 
may impose criminal penalties. 
Every presumption will be indulged in favor of constitutionality, 
and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of validity. State v. 
Packer Corporation, 77 U. 500, 297 P.2d 1013 (1931). When legislative 
action is within the scope of the police power, fairly debatable ques-
tions as to reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the 
courts, but for the legislature. Standard Oil Company v. Marysvale, 
279 U.S. 582, 49 S.Ct. 430, 73 L.Efl. 856 (1928). The Utah Supreme 
Court; in the case of Goodrich v. Public Service Commission, 114 U. 
296, 198 P.2d 975 (1948), declared it was cognizant of the duties 
and prerogatives conferred upon the Division of Health by the statutes 
referred to in UCA, § 26-15-1 to 26-15-5 (1953, as amended), in that 
•in fulfilling those responsibilities, .the Division of Health should 
be allowed considerable latitude of discretion. 
The state legislatures may provide for the execution of their 
policies through administrative agencies by conferring specific duties 
and powers. The Utah Supreme Court in two cases held as follows: 
"It (legislature) may, however, provide for the execution 
through administrative agencies of its legislative policy and 
may confer upon such administrative officers certain powers 
and the duty of determining the question of the existence of 
certain facts upon which the effect or execution of its legis-
lative policy may be dependent. Rowell v. State Board of 
Agriculture, 98 U. 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940); see also, McGreu v. 
Industrial Commission, 96 U. 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938); Morgan v. 
United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1937). 
A leaislature mav nrnnprlv anfhnri?^ an a^mi m" *•*-*--*+- \ *r^  ^eei~~~ ±.~ 
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determine questions of fact. Any discretion left to the adminis-
trative officer is left to the application of the rules of reason 
to facts proven or found. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any sort of sen-
sible, practical effect may be given it. Norville v. State Tax 
Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P.2d 937 (1940); State v. Packer Cor-
poration, 77 U. 500, 297 P. 1013 (1931); State v. Packer Corpor-
ation, 78 U. 177, 2 P12d 114 (1931); Packer Corporation v. State, 
285 U.S. 105, 52 S.Ct. 273, 76 L.Ed. 643 )1931). In Revna v. Trade 
Commission, 113 U. 155, 192 P.2d 563 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court 
held as follows: 
"We recognize, of course, that the legislature 
may properly delegate to some administrative body the 
duty of ascertaining the facts upon which the provisions 
of a law are to function, and also, that one of the 
methods of initiating activity on the part of the admin-
istrative body may be by petition of the citizens con-
cerned. Such procedure is not in and of itself 
^ defective as an improper delegation of legislative 
authority. The question of an improper delegation 
of legislative authority is embedded in the extent of 
the power granted to the administrative body ....Id.., 
at 576. 
The law referred to in this case was enacted as a health and safety 
measure in the interest of the public, and that should govern its 
functioning. 
The Utah Air Conservation Act sets forth public policy and 
purposes very clearly. It contains guidelines and standards to 
direct the Utah Air Conservation Committee in fulfilling its pur-
poses. Section 26-24-1.5(1) provides the legislature's declara-
./ 
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tion of public policy: 
"To achieve and maintain such levels of air quality 
as will protect human health and safety, and to the 
greatest degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and 
animal life and property, foster the comfort and conven-
ience of people. . . " 
It is clear that this declaration of public policy acts as a 
guideline, in and of itself, for the decisions of the air con-
servation committee. 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee is also charged with: 
"Air pollution prevention, abatement, and control; 
to provide...distribution of responsibility among 
state and local units of government... to provide a 
framework within which air quality levels may be pro-
tected and consideration given to the public interest 
at all levels of planning and development within the 
state." Section 26-24-1.5(3), Utah Code Annotated, 
(1971, as amended). 
The declared purpose of the Act is to "secure and maintain 
appropriate levels of air quality. Utah Code Annotated, Section 
26-24-1.5(2), (1971, as amended). 
The Act provides definitions within which the committee's . 
decisions are bounded. For example, the guidelines provided by the 
definition of "air contaminant", 26-24-2(1), demonstrates that the 
administrative jurisdiction and discretion of the committee it limited 
to specific situations involving "particulate matter, or any gas, 
vapor, suspended solids, or combination thereof, excluding steam 
and water vapors." 
Another standard by which the committee must abide is the restric-
tion inherent in the definition of "air pollution" at UCA Section 
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of one or more air contaminants in such quantities and 
duration -and under such conditions and circumstances as is 
or tends to be injurious to human health or welfare, 
animal or plant life, or property, or would unreas-
sonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or use 
of property as determined by the standards, rules, 
and regulations adopted by the Air Conservation 
Committee." 
Recognizing that further definition and scientific know-
ledge were beyond its capabilities, the legislature enacted UCA 
Section 26-24-10(2), (1971) as amended, which empowered the air conser-
vation committee to: 
"establish such emission control requirements, 
by rule, regulation or standard, as in its judgment 
may be necessary to prevent, abate, or control air 
pollution.,f 
By adopting such controlling phraseology, the legislature limits 
the rules and regulations adopted by the Air Conservation Committee 
to those which are necessary. This guideline was referred to in 
the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. State Department of Health, 
sppra, at 1180, where the court concluded: 
"In cases dealing with other areas of legitimate 
legislative activity where precision was determined 
to be impossible . . . such broad standards as "reason-
able11 or ''necessary" have been found sufficient as 
standards, although incapable of precise definition." 
It is apparent, therefore, that this section, 26-24-10(2), pro-
vides sufficient guidelines and standards as to be within the 
bounds of proper legislative delegation of authority. 
Additionally, the committee, in adopting standards of air 
quality, must conduct public hearings. It is clear from this 
requirement that the legislature has provided for due process in 
•.—* 
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the adoption of air quality standards. UCA §26-24-10 (1) (1971) as amended. 
A final example of legislative control of the Air Conservation 
Committee is the requirement in § 26-24-5, subsection 18, that any 
rules, regulations or standards adopted by the Air Conservation 
Committee must be in conformity and consistent with provisions of 
federal law. With the adoption of federal emission controls in 
1971, the state legislature found it necessary to delegate the 
complex, highly scientific matters of emission controls to a body 
capable of implementing federal demands. This same subsection also 
gives the Board of Health broad powers of control over the Air 
Conservation Committee, allowing the board the right to: 
"amend or modify any action of the committee or 
its executive secretary if the board deems such amend-
ment or modification necessary for the protection of 
public health." 
I The state legislature has the power, and responsiblity, to 
delegate to an administrative agency a reasonable measure of 
authority to accomplish the purpose for which the agency was created. 
It has long been accepted that the legislature may delegate a "rea-
sonable measure" of its authority which is necessary to accomplish 
the constitutional purposes it desires. Kesler and Sons Construc-
tion Company v. Utah State Division of Health, 30 U.2d 90, 513 P.2d 
1019 (1973); see also People ex rel. Curren v. Shaumar, 392 111. 17, 
63 N.E.2d 744 (1945). The delegation of authority from the legis-
lature to an administrative agency is necessary, particularly in 
view of the modern multitudinous details of scientific necessity. 
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1# 92 L.Ed. 10 (1943). This especially true in areas requiring 
depth and specialization. While there may be a question of "degree" 
of powers delegated, there is no doubt that the legislature may 
delegate to an administrative agency the exercise of a limited 
portion of its legislative power with respect to some specific 
subject matter. N.J. Pel Co.v. Communications Workers of America, 
5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950); Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 
82 P.2d 977 (1938). 
A state legislature may also provide for the execution, through 
administrative agencies, of its legislative policy, and may confer 
upon such administrative officers certain powers and the duty of 
determining the question of existence of certain facts upon which 
the effect or execution of its legislative policy may be dependent. 
Clayton v. Bennett, 5 U.2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956). 
The Utah Air Conservation Act was enacted by the Utah Legis-
lature in 1967. This act provided for,the creation in the State 
Division of Health of the Utah Air Conservation Council, now known 
as the Utah Air Conservation Committee for the State of Utah, and 
empowered it to act in the control and prevention of air pollution. 
In the eight years since its adoption, it has never been challenged 
as unconstitutional until now. In the instant case, the appellant 
fails to carry a burden of proof which automatically attaches in 
any case where a legislative act is involved. A legislative enact-
ment is presumptively valid, and one who challenges it bears an 
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extremely heavy burden to establish its unconstitutionality beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Stat.e, 179 
Colo. 223, 499 P.2d 1176 (1972); Department of Health v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corporation, supra; State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing. 
Company, supra. To bear the extremely heavy burden of proving the 
unconstitutionality of the statute, one would expect relevant 
jurisdictional case law, or at the minimum, a citation or two from 
the common law of other jurisdictions. While all 50 states have 
legislative enactments very similar to the Utah Air Conservation Act 
and similar visible emission regulations, the appellant has failed ' 
to show where even one of these 50 acts and regulations has been 
successfully challenged. 
As an example of one of the enabling statutes in a sister state, 
Respondent cites Section 5(b) of the Illinois Environmental Protection 
Act. It reads as follows: 
"The Board (Pollution Control Board) shall deter-
mine, define, and implement the environmental control 
standards applicable in the State of Illinois and may 
adopt rules and regulations in accordance with Title 
VII of this act." 
This is a very broad jurisdictional statement for the board to act 
in defining rules and regulations with regard to air pollution. 
This act has been upheld, despite successive attacks to challenge 
its constitutionality. 
Furthermore, the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to 
administrative agencies is normally sustained as valid, and the 
standards which must accompany such a grant of legislative power 
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Need not necessarily be set forth in expressed terms if they might 
reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole. The 
Court# in People v. Bevevino, 202 Misc. 723, 112 N.Y.S.2d 647, (1952), 
which involved a prosecution for the violation of the regulation 
limiting the density of smoke to be released into the atmosphere, 
held that the delegation of the New York City Council to the Bureau 
of Smoke Control of the power to adopt and amend rules and regula-
tions relating to emission controls in open air of smoke and soot, 
as well as fly ash products of combustion was not unconstitutional 
and was a proper delegation of legislative authority. Defendant 
claimed that the very fact that it was the agency and not the city 
council which created the offense under which he was prosecuted 
indicated that the legislature had unlawfully delegated to the 
agency the general power to determine what shall constitute an 
cfffense or a violation of the law. Rejecting this contention, the 
court pointed out that the legislature may delegate to an administra-
tive agency the power to make reasonable rules and regulations with 
the force and effect of law, and that in so doing, it is proper for 
the legislature to declare the violation of these rules to be a 
crime and provide the punishment for their violation. In the case 
of Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution Commission, 2 Pa. Cmlth. 441, 
279 A.2d 388 (1971), the court held that the enforcement of the rules 
and regulations promulgated by the Air Pollution Commission did not 
constitute a confiscation of property without due process. By merely 
pointing out that no matter how seemingly complete the scheme or pri-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vate ownership may be under our system of government, all property 
must be held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regu-
lation by the government to preserve the health, safety and morals 
of the people. In Houston Compressed Steel Corporation v. State, 
456 S.W#2d 768 (Tex.Civ. App.1970), the Texas Clean Air Act was 
attacked as an unlawful delegation to an administrative agency, in 
that it gave such agency the power to adopt and regulate and control 
the level of emissions of their contaminants into the air. The court 
took the position that the science of air pollution control is new 
and inexact, and that such legislative standards are difficult to 
devise, and that if such standards are to be effected, they must be 
broad; for if they are too precise, they will provide an easy es-
cape for those who wish to circumvent the law. While thereby im-
pliedly admitting the broadness of the definition of air pollution 
in the Texas law, the court was of the opinion that the definition 
was clear and easily capable of understanding. See also, State v. 
Arizona Mine Supply Company, 107 Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (1971). 
It has been alleged that the regulation is both vague and in-
definite. This contention was not persuasive in similar cases. In 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. Pollution Control Board, supra, the 
statute was found to be valid and did not constitute an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power. The petitioner, Fry, had alleged 
an "abdication" of legislative responsibility. The court, however, 
found this to be unpersuasive. The State of Utah contends that any 
more specific guidelines than those already established, would in-
fringe upon the flexibility and adaptibility of the Utah Air Cnn-
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servation Act. in the case of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. 
State Department of Health, supra, at 1179, the court stated as 
follows: 
"The modern tendency is to permit liberal grants of 
discretion to administrative agencies in order to facili-
tate the administration of laws dealing with involved 
economic and governmental conditions. In other words, 
the necessities of modern legislation dealing with com-
plex economic and social problems have lead to judicial 
approval of broad standards for administrative action, 
especially in regulatory enactments under the police 
power. 
The court also indicated that the 1969 law to which the Fry Company 
advocated a return, as amended in 1970, was too precise — "imprac-
tical, if not impossible to administer.11 .Id., at 1179. 
The delegation of "quasi-legislative" powers to administrative 
agencies, authorizing them to make rules and regulations, within 
proper standards fixed by the legislature, are normally sustained 
as valid, and barring a total abdication of their legislative powers, 
there is no real constitutional prohibition against the delegation 
of a large measure of authority to an administrative agency for the 
administration of a statute enacted pursuant to a state's police 
power. The standards which must accompany such grant of legisla-
tive power need not necessarily be set forth in expressed terms if 
they might reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a 
whole. State v. Arizona Mine Supply Company, supra, at 625. It 
is clear that the Act is not vague and that the visible emissions 
regulations accompanying the act are both definite and adequate, 
and that the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to the Utah Air 
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Conservation Committee is clearly constitutional. 
We therefore urge that this court hold as did the High Court 
of Colorado, that: 
"The standards established in the Air Pollution 
Control Act are not so broad as to result in an im-
proper delegation of legislative authority, and the 
Fry Roofing Company has failed to meet its burden of 
overcoming the presumption of validity in this re-
spect.'1 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. State Depart-
ment of Health, supra, at 1180. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH AIR CONSERVATION ACT IMPOSES CIVIL 
SANCTIONS AND THE IMPOSITION OF SUCH PENAL-
TIES BY THE COMMITTEE DID NOT DEPRIVE THE 
LLOYD A. FRY ROOFING COMPANY OF ITS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
The Federal Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial 
in civil action in federal court, and nearly every state consti-
tution contains a similar guarantee. See Utah Constitution, Art. 
I, §10. They do not extend, but preserve the right of jury trial 
as it existed in English history, either in 1791 when the Seventh 
Amendment was adopted, Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 
79 L.Ed. 603 (1943); Baltimore and C. Great Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 
654, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636 (1934), or, in the case of the 
states at the date of the first state constitution. People v. One, 
1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951), in which 
the court held as follows: 
"The constitutional right to jury trial . . . is 
the right as it existed at common law at the time the 
state constitution was adopted . . . and what that 
right is, is a purely historical question, a fact which 
is to be ascertained like any other social, political 
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or legal fact . . . It is necessary, therefore, to 
ascertain what was the rule of the English common 
law upon this subject in 1850." 
The foregoing quotation emphasizes the point that the right to a 
jury trial as preserved by the federal and state constitutions has 
substantially the same meaning, extent, and application as it had 
at common law, and the provisions related to this right are to be 
interpreted and construed in the light of the common law, at the 
time of their adoption. 
In all other cases, the legislature may provide for a hearing 
or trial without a jury, as they have done in hearings before admin-
istrative agencies. An early statute setting up a special tribunal 
to hear claims against a municipal corporation was held constitution-
ally valid under the Seventh Amendment, as a proceeding "not in the 
nature of a suit at common law.1' Guthrie National Bank v. City of 
Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 19 S.Ct. 513, 43 L.Ed. 796 (1898). Under 
constitutional provisions, the right of trial by jury is preserved 
inviolate only as the classes of cases in which that right was en-
joyed before the adoption of the constitution. In all other cases, 
the legislature may provide for a hearing or a trial without a jury. 
The 7th Amend, didn't create a right to a jury trial but merely pre-
served rights then existing at common law. General Tire and Rubber 
Company v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 191 (4th Circuit), cert. den. 377 U.S. 
952. The purpose and effect of Article III, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution, providing that at the trial of all crimes ex-
cepting cases of impeachment shall be by jury, is not to enlarge 
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trial by jury in all cases in which it had been recognized by the 
common law and in all cases of like nature. Ex parte Querin, 317 
U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942). 
Every state legislature has passes some form of clean air pro-
visions, and created an administrative agency to promulgate rules 
and enforce its sanctions. Violators are always allowed a form of 
judicial review which begins with a hearing before the agency and 
concludes with an appeal to the state or United States Supreme Court. 
The Illinois Environmental Protection Act is quite similar to that 
of Utah in this respect. The clean air provisions, as far as 
judicial review, in the State of Illinois, are: 
Any party to a board hearing, any person who filed 
a complaint on which a hearing was denied, any person 
who has been denied a variance or permit under this act, 
and any party adversely affected by a final order or 
determination of the board may obtain judicial review, 
by filing a petition for a veview within 35 days after 
the entry of the order or other final action complained 
of, pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative 
Review Act, approved May 8, 1945, as amended, and the 
rules adopted pursuant thereto, except that review shall 
be afforded directly in the appellate court for the dis-
trict in which the cause of action arose and not in the 
circuit court. Review of any rule or regulation pro-
mulgated by the board shall not be limited by this 
section but may also be had as provided in Section 29 
of this act. 
The Utah Code is similar in its provisions to those of the Illinois 
Code. It is clear that administrative hearings before qualified 
members of the agency are an adequate safeguard for the prote tion 
of civil rights. Section 26-24-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) allows for a review of any final order of the committee 
in the Utah State Supreme Court. The appropriate sections of the 
code are Section 26-24-11(31 fW . w"hir-"h c^fnc. 
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Hearings may be held before the committee or any 
hearing examiner of the committee or any committee mem-
ber as hearing examiner when this member has been es-
pecially appointed by the committee to hold such hearing. 
The committee may appoint one or more hearing examiners, 
and the committee or any hearing examiner shall have 
power and authority to call, preside and conduct hear-
ings, including the power to issue subpoenaes to compel 
witnesses and the production of pertinent, relevent 
evidence on behalf of all parties. A full and complete 
record will be kept of all proceedings before the com-
mittee or hearing examiner, and all testimony shall be 
taken down by a reporter employed by the committee. 
Upon the conclusion of a hearing, a hearing examiner 
or committee, as the case may be, shall make findings 
of fact which shall include all evidential or ultimate 
facts necessary to support this order. Findings of fact 
and orders of copies of all of them shall be furnished 
to each of the parties in interest, the original of which 
shall be part of the records of the case. The order of 
the hearing examiner or committee shall be the final order 
of the committee unless a petition for a review is filed 
as provided in subsection 3(c) of this section. 
Subsection 3(c) of this section states: 
Any person or persons aggrieved by an order entered 
by a hearing examiner or by the committee may file a 
motion for a review of the order. Upon the filing of 
s- such motion to review his order, the hearing examiner 
may: 
(i) Reopen the case and enter a suppplemental 
order after holding such further hearing and receiving 
such further evidence as he may deem necessary; or 
(ii) Amend or modify his prior order by supple-
mental order; or 
(iii) Refer the entire case to the committee. 
The hearing examiner makes the supplemental order, it shall 
be final, unless a motion to review the same shall be filed 
with the committee. 
Section 26-24-12 states: 
Except as specifically provided in this section 
and in Section* 26-24-11(5)(e), all final orders or 
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determinations of the committee or the executive 
secretary are subject to judicial review in the 
Supreme Court of Utah. Such a review may be se-
cured by any person adversely affected by the such 
person filing a petition in the Supreme Court at 
any time after this final order or determination 
but not later than 30 days after the date of any 
final enforcement order or determination which 
specifically requires affirmative action on the 
part of such person if this person made an appear-
ance at the hearing held before the committee as 
to which the final order or determination was made 
or is not served with notice of such hearing, if 
notice was required by provisions of this act. 
The petition shall be served upon the executive 
secretary and shall state grounds upon which re-
view is sought. As to matters directly appeal-
able to the Supreme Court, upon review, the 
court may affirm, modify or set aside the final 
order, but only upon the following grounds: 
(a) that the committee or the executive 
secretary acted without or in excess of its powers. 
(b) that the findings of fact and conclusions 
of the committee are not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
The committee and every party to the action or proceeding 
** before the committee shall have the right to appear in the 
review proceeding. 
The Utah Code provisions have allowed for adequate due process 
of law. Persons adversely affected are allowed a hearing, the right 
to a rehearing, and a final review of the order in the Utah Supreme 
Court. Due process of law does not requre a jury trial. As mentioned 
earlier, the right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate, but only 
in cases where it was maintained at common law. The Illinois Con-
stitution is similar to the Utah State Constitution with regard to 
the right of trial by jury, as well. Article I, Section 13, of the 
Illinois State Constitution states: "The right of trial by jury 
r N v ^ f ^ f r t v o o n - i r t v o ^ e V i a l 1 r e m a i n i rnn* n l a f p " 
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Article I# Section 10# of the Utah State Constitution states, in 
part as follows: 
MIn capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate . . . " 
Where there is a determination of facts by experts in an adminis-
trative hearing, with the right of appellate review of the decision, 
the right to a trial by jury has not been abridged. At common law, 
no administrative hearing procedures were known, and the state and 
federal constitutions merely preserved the right to jury trial. 
They did not enlarge them. When a determination of facts is made 
by a panel of experts, more able to sift through the complex scienti-
fic and technical evidence, there is a lessening of the probability 
of error. 
A challenge to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act was 
made in the case of Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 111. 
App. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973). Several issues, basic to the 
instant case, were involved. Called upon to determine whether the 
Act provided for criminal or civil sanctions, the court concluded: 
" . • • It is to be construed as evidencing that 
a civil sanction was intended. No mention of crime or 
criminal prosecution is made in the Act . . . Id. 
at 542. 
The Utah statutes evidence as well a civil sanction rather than a 
criminal sanction or prosecution in the Utah Air Conservation Act. 
The petitioner, in Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra, 
claimed that his constitutional right to a jury trial was be-
ing deprived. The court, ruling this contention to be meritless, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
explained: 
Section 13 of Article I of the Constitution of 
1970 provides: 'The right of trial by jury as here-
tofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.1 . . . /E/xcept 
for changes in punctuation /it/ is identical with the 
. . . 1870 Constitution of Illinois. No change in 
construction was, therefore, intended. It has been con-
sistently held that such constitutional language was 
designed simply to secure thr right of trial by jury 
in all tribunals, as it had heretofore been enjoyed; 
but it was not intended to confer the right in any 
class of cases where it had not previously existed; 
and that it was not intended to guarantee trial by 
jury in special statutory proceedings unknown at / 
common law. Ford v. E.P.A., supra, at 545. 
The same conclusion was reached in Cobin v. Pollution Control 
Board, 16 111. App.3d 958, 307 N.E.2d 191 (1974). In Lloyd A. Fry 
Roofing Company v. Pollution Control Board, supra, the court stated: 
Petitioner's contention that the act deprives it' 
of its constitutional right to a trial by jury is also 
without merit. . . . /t/he Act provides for the crea-
tion of an administrative agency to enforce the Act. 
The constitutional guarantee of right to trial by jury 
was never intended to apply to administrative proceedings 
^ which were unknown at common law, and therefore, peti-
tioner cannot argue that his right has been abridged. 
Id., at 35 7-358. 
In the case of Lloyd a Fry Roofing Company v. State of Texas, 
516 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), the state brought an action 
for injunctive relief and statutory penalties for alleged violations 
of the Clean Air Air by the manufacturing of asphalt roofing shin-
gles. In this case the court held that the primary jurisdiction 
must first be exercised by an administrative body before a court 
can obtain jurisidiction. This supports the position that the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is before an administrative agency 
and not before a trial by jury. It is clear that adequate pro-
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cedural safeguards exist to protect basic rights. The Utah Code 
provisions have allowed for adequate due process of law and do not 
require a right to jury trial. Persons adversely affected are 
allowed notice, a hearing, the right to a rehearing and final re-
view by the Utah Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the penal-
ties provided in the Utah Air Conservation Act provide for civil 
penalties. A hearing is provided before an administrative agency, 
and no actual adjudication in a court of law occurs. Primary 
jurisdiction is conducted by the administrative agency, and enforce-
ment lies with the determination of such administrative agency. No 
criminal sanctions are imposed by a court of law in accordance with 
the penalty provisions of the Utah Air Conservation Act. No penal-
ties are listed in the penal code, and the procedures described are 
clearly administrative in nature. This is an administrative hearing 
and due process protections under the state and federal constitutions 
do not require that the government's case for civil penalty be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State and federal court rulings hold that 
a proceeding, such as the one at bar, is civil in nature, even though 
the effect is to punish an offense. The courts have concluded that 
in this type of proceeding the correct standard of proof is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As already shown, there is judicial agreement that the defendant in 
such a proceeding does not have a right to a jury trial, is not en-
titled to the presumption of innocence, and that the action is con-
ducted according to the rules of civil procedure. 
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In a leading case, the United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 
34 S.Ct. 213, 58 L.Ed. 494 (1914), the Supreme Court reviewed a 
long line of federal cases dealing with the issue of whether an 
action to collect a penalty was civil or criminal in nature and 
then stated: 
It is a necessary conclusion from these 
cases (1) That as respects a pecuniary penalty 
for the commission of a public offense, Con-
gress competently may authorize . . . enforce-
ment of such penalty by either a criminal 
prosecution or a civil action; . . . and (3) 
That, if not directed otherwise, such an 
action is to be conducted and determined 
according to the same rules and with the same 
incidents as are other civil actions. 
As to the quantum of evidence required to recover the penalty, the 
court decided: 
. . . while in a strictly criminal prosecution 
the jury may not return a verdict against the 
defendant unless the evidence establishes his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in a civil 
action, it is the duty of the jury to resolve 
the issues of fact according to a reasonable 
preponderance of the evidence, and this al-
though they may involve a penalized or criminal 
act. icL, at 49. 
A major theory in the cases with regard to jury trial are that 
since there were no administrative hearing procedures known at com-
mon law, the state and federal constitutions merely preserve the 
rights that existed at their adoption, but do not enlarge upon them. 
A second significant theory is that when a determination of facts is 
made by a panel of experts, more able to sift through the complex 
scientific and technical evidence of air pollution cases, there is 
a lessening of a probability of error. Besides, administrative Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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agencies do not impose criminal penalties. Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1937), wherein the court 
stated as follows: 
Civil procedure is incompatible with the accepted 
rules and constitutional guarantees governing the trial 
of criminal prosecution. Ij3., at 402. 
In Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 68 S.Ct. 115, 92 L.Ed. 59 
(1947), the court held as follows: 
The concept of a jury passing independently on 
an issue previously determined by an administrative 
body or reviewing the action of an administrative 
body is contrary to settled federal administrative 
practice; the constitutional right to a jury trial 
does not include the right to have a jury pass on 
the validity of an administrative order . . . When 
the judge determines that there was a basis in fact 
to support classification, the issue need not and 
should not be submitted to the jury. IcL , at 444. 
Committing the factfinding function to an administrative agency 
does not, in itself, constitute a denial of due process of law. 
There is substantial authority that a requirement of due process in 
a constitutional provision does not require a trial by jury. Hawkins 
v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678 (1916); and that 
such a due process clause does not imply that all trials in state 
courts affecting personal or property rights must be by a jury trial. 
Hardware Dealers Manufacturing v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 52 S.Ct. 
69, 76 L.Ed. 214 (19 ); Wagner Electric Manufacturing Company v. 
Linden, 26? U.S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 589, 67 L.Ed 961 (1922). In investi-
gating adjudicatory functions in an administrative agency, the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial may not be violated. Lipke v. 
..Ct. 549, 66 L.Ed. 1061 (1921); Joint 
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Anti-Fascist Refugee Community v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 
95 L.Ed. 817 (1950). Neither the state nor the constitution guaran-
tee or preserve the right of trial by jury, except in those cases 
where it existed when the constitution was adopted. Constitutional 
guarantees do not apply to a statutory proceeding nor in the nature 
of a suit at common law. The constitutional guarantee does not 
apply to special and summary proceedings created by statute sub-
sequent to the adoption of the constitution, where they are not in 
the nature of suits at common law and are dissimilar to such suits. 
Determination effects in such proceedings may be left to adminis-
trative agencies. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 
301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 
?85 U.S. 22, 5 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 595 (1931). 
POINT VI 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY THE 
CERTIFIED SMOKE READERS TO TAKE THEIR VISIBLE 
EMISSIONS READINGS WERE REASONABLE AND WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF THE "OPEN FIELDS" DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized." 
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
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seizures marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values 
of the constitution. Whether a particular "search11 or "seizure" 
is unreasonable depends upon two traditional factors. First, does 
the person exhibit an "actual expectation of privacy?" Second, 
is that exhibited expectation "one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The facts of the instant 
case unequivocably demonstrate that the appellant exhibited no 
expectation of privacy, and that even if appellant did exhibit 
such an expectation, it would not be one that society would deem 
reasonable. 
First, the emissions from Fry's two stacks were clearly visi-
ble to persons in the area (Tr., Vol.1, p.252). Second, when the 
Division of Health and County inspectors visited the plant vicinity 
to make the readings, they notified the Fry company prior to the 
making of their readings and were never asked to leave the premises. 
There is no indication that the appellant maintained an objection to 
periodic inspections, and, in fact, assisted with a demonstration on 
September 5, 1973. Finally, the evidence shows that the smoke readers 
made the Fry company aware of their readings and even showed them 
the results of those readings after their readings had been taken. 
The smoke readers made their readings either off the plant premises 
or on the plant premises, generally open to the public. The con-
siderations of visibility, public access, and no showing of intrusion 
all demonstrate that the appellant neither exhibited nor had any 
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actual expectation of privacy and was not entitled to any protections 
of the Fourth Amendment. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 
S.Ct. 1738, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1966). Moreover, the courts support 
the proposition that even if Fry Company could show that it had a 
subjective expectation of privacy, it would not have been one that 
society would deem reasonable. 
Even if the smoke reader's observations of the highly visible 
emissions can be termed a search, in that the observers occasion-
ally stood on company land, it was not unreasonable, since such 
action clearly falls within the "open fields" exception to the 
Fourth Amendment. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 
445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1923), where the defendant's own illegal actions 
of concealing moonshine whiskey were observed by revenue agents 
concealed on his land, the court held that the "special protection 
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their "persons, 
houses, papers and effects" is not extended to the open fields. 
Supra, at 59. See also United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, at 
640 (9th Cir. 1970). 
In the most recent decision concerning this aspect of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States held the "open 
fields" exception applicable to administrative inspections with 
regard to air pollution. In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western 
Alfalfa Corporation, 416 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 1966, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 
(1974), an inspector of the Colorado Health Department conducted 
visible emissions readings of smoke emitted from respondent's stacks, 
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without first obtaining a warrant or the owner's consent. After a 
hearing by the Variance Board and a review by the district court, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that pollution tests of this 
nature violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches. The Supreme Court of Colorado denied certiorari, 
but it was granted by the United States Supreme Court. In reversing 
the Colorado decision, the United States Supreme Court held unani-
mously that (1) the inspector's observation from company-owned land 
did not constitute an unreasonable search, since he had not entered 
the plant or offices, but merely cited plumes of smoke, visible to 
anyone who was near the plant; there had been no showing that the 
public was excluded from the property, and (2) the inspector's 
action in conducting visual smoke opacity readings, whether he 
operated on or outside the premises, was within the "open fields" 
exception of the Fourth Amendment. 
In summary, it is clear that the instant case falls within 
the bounds of Western Alfalfa, and that the administrative searches 
conducted by the state and county-employed inspectors were reasonable 
and within the scope of the "open fields" doctrine. The accurate 
smoke readings were done according to the rules and regulations 
within the exception• No expectation of privacy on the defendant's 
land was intended, and the readings were taken where the public was 
allowed to frequent. The nature of the violations are clearly in 
violation of public health laws and surely outweigh the allegation 
of a right of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not grant an absolute 
right. It also does not allow a protection of such rights as alleged Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by appellant. Notice was received by Fry Company officials both 
before the readings were taken and by notice of violation mailed 
subsequently, reporting violations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee clearly met its burden of 
establishing that the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company violated Section 
3.2 of the Visible Emissions Regulations. The findings, conclu-
sions and decision of the committee are based on substantial and 
factual evidence as indicated in the transcript of the hearing. The 
Utah Air Conservation Act has provided clear and reasonable legis-
lative guidelines to the Utah Air Conservation Committee to carry 
out its administrative functions within the protections of the due 
process of law; The Utah State Implementation Plan for Air Quality 
clearly sets forth the emission limitations which were approved by 
the Environmental Protection Agency to insure that federal ambient 
air standards could be attained in accordance with the Clean Air Act 
of 1970 and its accompanying amendments. The state submits that the 
Utah Air Conservation Act imposes sanctions in. accordance with admin-
istrative determinations and that the Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company 
was not denied any constitutional right to a jury trial. The com-
mittee further alleges that the administrative searches conducted 
by smoke readers were objective in nature and conducted by properly 
trained and certified smoke readers to make visible emissions readings 
which were reasonable and within the scope of the "open fields" 
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doctrine. 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee requests that this court 
should affirm the order of Dr. Grant S. Winn, decision and orders 
entered by the Utah Air Conservation Committee and memorandum 
decision of the Third Judicial District Court. Respondent sub-
mits that this Court must sustain the findings and conclusions of 
the Utah Air Conservation Committee upon the basis that substantial 
and factual evidence was presented at the hearing, showing that the 
committee and executive secretary acted within the powers granted 
to them by the legislature. Substantial evidence was presented to 
support the findings and decisions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
WILLIAM C/. QUIGLEY ^ *{ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
'?: iy * r<y. .^ . ,r^/? c^*' 
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Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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